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Abstract
The contention of this Article, however, is that a number of other developments have taken
place which–in mostly unanticipated ways–may lead to more significant change in the scope and
shape of EU human rights policy than the Charter alone. In particular, two developments have
combined in recent years to open the way for a more general and comprehensive human rights
policy which, while less concerned with the contentious competence and justiciability debates
generated by the Charter, is already beginning to manifest itself in interesting ways. The first of
these developments was the shaping of a more principled and graduated crisis response procedure
for the suspension of the rights of Member States in response to serious and persistent violations
of human rights. The second development was an unprecedented degree of scrutiny of the human
rights performance of prospective Member States which served to highlight the familiar doublestandards critique in relation to the EU’s internal and external policies, and provided a major
impetus to the development of more effective ongoing monitoring and coordination arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of significant legal changes in the
landscape of human rights protection in the European Union
("EU") have taken place. Since 2000, commentators have focused most of their attention on the significance of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights ("Charter"), which was drafted and proclaimed in that year,' on its subsequent reception by the EU legal and political community, 2 and more recently on the debate
which took place within the Convention on the Future of Europe ("European Convention") 3 about its proper role within a
new European constitutional settlement.4 However, the potential of the Charter as a robust instrument of human rights pro* Department of Law, European University Institute. Thanks are due to Berdi
Berdiyev and Larissa Ogertschnig for their research assistance.
1. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 364/1 (2000)
[hereinafter Charter]. For an in-depth discussion on the drafting and proclamation
process of the Charter, see generally Lord Goldsmith, A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and
Principles, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REv 1201 (2001); Grdinne de Bdrca, The Drafting of the
EU Charter of FundamentalRights, 26 EUR. L. REv. 126 (2001).
2. See, e.g.,John Morijn,JudicialReference to the EU FundamentalRights Charter,available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/othOO0602-en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 23, 2003); see generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BtORCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES &
MATERIALS 362 (3d ed. 2003).
3. The Convention on the Future of Europe took place between February 2002
and July 2003. See The European Convention, Documents of the Convention, available
at http://european-convention.eu.int/doc-register.ASP?MAX=161&LANG=EN&Content=DOC (last visited Dec. 23, 2003) [hereinafter European Convention] (providing
most of the official documents relating to the proceedings of the Convention and its
working groups).
4. See, e.g., The European Convention, Working Group II, Incorporation of the
Charter/Accession to the ECHR, CONV 354/02, available at http://register.consilium.
eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvOO/00354en2.pdf (Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Working
Group II Final Report]. The recommendations of the Working Group were adopted
practically in their entirety by the European Convention's presidency and plenary, and
the Charter was incorporated into Part II of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe presented by the European Convention at the conclusion of its work. See
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, O.J. C 169/1 (2003)
(not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
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tection has been undermined in part by the intense political focus upon certain of its key provisions, both at the drafting stage
and during the proceedings of the so-called constitutional Convention. The twin political concerns of limiting the potential of
the Charter to expand or alter the powers of the EU on the one
hand, and limiting the justiciability of certain of its provisions on
the other hand, have sapped its vitality as a legal instrument in
several ways. The contention of this Article, however, is that a
number of other developments have taken place which - in
mostly unanticipated ways - may lead to more significant
change in the scope and shape of EU human rights policy than
the Charter alone.
In particular, two developments have combined in recent
years to open the way for a more general and comprehensive
human rights policy which, while less concerned with the contentious competence and justiciability debates generated by the
Charter, is already beginning to manifest itself in interesting
ways. The first of these developments was the shaping of a more
principled and graduated crisis response procedure for the suspension of the rights of Member States in response to serious
and persistent violations of human rights. This was one of the
unanticipated consequences of the Haider affair in 2000 when
the governments of the EU Member States reacted hastily to the
entry into coalition government of an extreme right-wing party
in Austria. 5 The second development was an unprecedented degree of scrutiny of the human rights performance of prospective
Member States which served to highlight the familiar doublestandards critique in relation to the EU's internal and external
policies,6 and provided a major impetus to the development of
more effective ongoing monitoring and coordination arrangements.
The EU, in other words, has been hoisted on its own petard,
5. The reference is to Jorg Haider who was the leader of the Austrian Freedom
Party ("FPO"), which was invited into the coalition government with the conservative
People's Party in 2000. See generally Michael Merlingen et al., The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria, 39 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 59 (2001).
6. For accounts of this double standards charge, see, e.g., Philip Alston & Joseph
H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union
and Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); Andrew
Williams, Enlargement of the Union and Human Rights Conditionality: A Policy of Distinction?, 25 EUR. L. REv. 601 (2000).
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and the combined influence of these events has arguably triggered the commencement of what could become the kind of
comprehensive human rights monitoring that has been called
for by various reform proposals over the years,7 but has been
largely ignored by the Council of Ministers and, until recently,
the European Commission. It may also have triggered the emergence of an embryonic open method of coordination ("OMC") 8
to develop and promote amongst the Member States an observance of the standards contained in the Charter.'
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
There are three principal features of a functioning international human rights system. The first and perhaps the most visible is the normative-judicial dimension. The norms of human
rights protection are agreed upon, articulated, and inscribed in
legal form, whether in a treaty, bill, charter of rights, constitution or other special legislative measure, and some degree ofjudicial or quasijudicial oversight is established. Although the
content of the particular norms may vary, as may the legal instrument that contains them and the degree of judicial power that
enforces them, the quasi-judicial dimension is nonetheless a central characteristic of most functioning human rights systems.
The key examples include: the United Nations' Human Rights
Committee established under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which has quasi-judicial powers in relation to individual complaints; the European Court of Human
Rights (which replaced the two-tier system previously consisting
7. See, e.g., Alston & Weiler, supra note 6. See also MART-rI
PLANCK-INSTITUT FOR AUSLANDISCHES

AHTISAARI ET AL., MAX-

OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, REPORT,

available at http://www.virtual-institute.de/en/Bericht-EU/report.pdf (Sept. 8, 2000)
(providing conclusions of the Three Wise Men report into the situation of Austria following the Haider affair); European Parliament resolution on the situation as regards
fundamental rights in the European Union, EUR. PARL. Doc. (A5-0223/2001), available
at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/special-issues-annual-EUPARL.html (2001); Final Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the European Union, EUR.
PARE. Doc. (A5-281/2003),
4 (2003).
8. See MariaJ. Rodrigues, The Open Method of Coordinationas a New Governance Tool,
in L'evoluzione della governance europea, EUROPA/EUROPE No. 2-3, at 96-107 (Mario Tel6
ed., 2001).
9. See E.U. NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS IN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (CFR-

CDF),

REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND

ITS MEMBER STATES IN

2002 (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/

justice home/cfr_cdf/doc/rapport_2002_en.pdf.
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also of a quasi-judicial Commission) which is a crucial component of the European Convention system; the Inter-American
system which has both a Commission and a Court;' ° and a recent
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights"
which envisages the establishment of a Court with possible jurisdiction to hear individual complaints, to complement the promotional role of the existing African Commission. 2
The second characteristic of human rights systems is the existence of some form of systemic monitoring of the observance
or non-observance of human rights commitments. This is generally a routine exercise in information gathering, whether by a
specially created monitoring body, by a parliamentary or expert
committee, or otherwise. Its function is to provide an ongoing
picture of the extent of compliance with the normative guarantees which have been established and agreed upon. Again, there
may be variance in the nature and resources of the monitoring
body, in the means by which and the sources from which information is gathered or supplied, and in the frequency of the process, but some form of periodic monitoring is a key element of a
functioning international human rights system.
The third characteristic is the existence of a mechanism for
responding to crises, in other words a method by which effective
action can be taken in response to evidence of a serious violation
of human rights standards. This will normally be some form of
sanction or other intervention designed to bring the violation to
an end. The effectiveness of a human rights system generally
depends on the relative strength of these different features and
on their capacity over time to instill a culture and an environment of respect for human rights in the functioning of day-today political and social life.
When we examine the human rights system of the EU, we
find a system that is still emergent, if not embryonic. As will be
10. See generally Jo M.

PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-

AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(2003).

11. See generally THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-2000 (Malcolm D. Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2002).
12. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rghts on the

Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 9, 1998,
OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (discussing access to court). The
rate of ratification of this protocol has so far been slow. But see Final Communique of
the Conference for West African States on the Protocol for the Establishment of the

African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (May 2003).
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seen below, there was originally an implicit division of functions
between the Council of Europe and the European Community
("EC") respectively, so that the EC until relatively recently played
little or no role in relation to the establishment or protection of
human rights. What has become evident in particular since the
establishment of the EU in the 1990s, however, is that the EU is
increasingly developing a human rights system of its own, in addition to, and perhaps complementary to, but distinct from that
of the Council of Europe. And as far as the three characteristics
identified above are concerned, the picture emerging in relation
to the EU system is an interesting one. As will be discussed in
further detail below, the normative dimension, clearly evident in
the drafting and proclamation of the Charter, is rendered ambiguous and contingent both by the postponement of a decision
on the Charter's legal status, as well as by the apparent decision
to discriminate in terms of justiciability between economic and
social rights as compared with civil and political rights. However, the second and third elements, the monitoring and crisisresponse elements, respectively, which have developed in less
clearly anticipated and more organic ways, suggest that the EU's
human rights system contains the promise of a possibly stronger
and more effective regime than most existing international and
regional human rights systems.
Even as it expands to twenty-five members,1 3 the closeness
of relations between Member States of the EU and the nature of
the political community established amongst them means that
the conduct of any one State is of greater concern to all others
than is generally true of the international community of States.
Additionally, national sovereignty concerns over external intervention are less stark and less compelling within the EU. In this
sense, the development of an effective response mechanism, in
particular following the lessons of the Haider affair, is likely to
be a higher priority and a more realistic prospect than in the
case of other regional systems, or of the international system in
general. Rather than the choice which faces looser organizations of States between inadequately effective attempts at mediation and influence on the one hand and drastic mechanisms 13. See Enlargement, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm (explaining that ten countries are expected to become Member States on
May 1, 2004). These ten countries are: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Id.
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such as suspension or expulsion from membership, or resort by
the international community to the use of force in extreme situations - on the other, the EU has both the incentive and the
means to develop more graduated response mechanisms in relation to its own Member States.
Further, the gradual emergence of human rights monitoring mechanisms in the EU, where other experiments with monitoring and benchmarking processes are being developed in a
number of social and economic policy fields,14 has the potential
to go beyond what other international human rights systems
have done so far. These mechanisms achieve this by developing
the information gathering and monitoring process into a genuine exercise in mutual learning, reflexive standard setting, and
articulation of best practices.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE EUS HUMAN RIGHTS ROLE:
THE ORTHODOX ACCOUNT
The familiar account of the EU's engagement with human
rights issues tells us that while the Council of Europe and its
leading instrument, the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR")," 5 were established in 1949 with the primary purpose
of promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, the
European Communities subsequently founded in the 1950s were
almost entirely devoted to economic integration and left the task
of human rights protection to the broader sister organization in
Strasbourg.1 6 In so far as human rights issues made their way
onto the EC's agenda, this was mostly in a reactive response by
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") to challenges posed to its
authority by national constitutional courts that were concerned
about the standards of protection in EC law for domestic constitutional rights.1 7 The question of accession by the EC to the
14. See infra notes 104-06.
15. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") entered into force on September 3, 1953.
16. For early and comprehensive accounts of the emergence of human rights - in
EC parlance "fundamental rights" - as an EC concern, see generally Andrew Clapham,
A Human Rights Policy for the European Community, 10 Y.B. EUR. L. 309 (1990); 2 HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: METHODS OF PROTECTION (Antonio Cassese et
al. eds., 1991).
17. The classic line of case law announcing the European Court of Justice's concern for fundamental human rights follows: Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt,

2004]

BEYOND THE CHARTER

ECHR was raised on various occasions, in particular by the European Commission, 8 but never found favor with the Member
States. Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the ECJ went on to
deliver a handful of judgments which touched on issues relating
to fundamental rights (mostly rights to property and to trade,
and procedural rights in competition cases), and the then relatively weak European Parliament regularly voiced its opinion on
international and domestic human rights issues,1" but otherwise
the EC's role in promoting or protecting human rights at home
or abroad remained minor.
The official and orthodox statement on the position of
human rights within the EU was made by the ECJ in its 1996
Opinion on Accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights,2 0 in which it declared that although respect for human
rights was a "condition for the legality" of EU action, the EC had
no specific competence to adopt general rules on human rights,
and its residual powers clause in Article 308 (formerly 235) of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty") 2 1 could not be misused in order to do So. 2 2 In the parCase 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, [1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 112; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970]
E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 225;J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgro[3handlung v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 338; Judgment of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (famous German case which challenged the stance of the European Court, also referred to
as the so-called Solange I decision, given by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 1974).
18. See Memorandum on the Accession of the European Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.C. BULL.
suPP. 2/79 (1979).

19. See Resolution adopting the Declaration of Fundamental rights and freedoms,
O.J. C 120/51 (1989).
20. See Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention, Case 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759 (Mar. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Opinion 2/94].
21. See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 308, O.J. C 325/33, at 153 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 140 (ex Article 235) [hereinafter
Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty of Nice amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice]
(amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty). Article 308
states the following:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall,
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ticular case at hand, the ECJ took the view that to use Article 308
to facilitate the EC's accession to the ECHR would bring about
such fundamental institutional changes that it would constitute a
defacto amendment of the EC Treaty, without using the appropriate procedure for amendment. This statement in fact remains the orthodox position, and in the absence of any final settlement on the Charter and on the Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe ("Draft Treaty")2 3 produced by the European Convention, it currently has two dimensions: first, that
the EU lacks general competence to act in the field of human
rights24 and has specific competence only as a dimension of a
restricted range of external policies and in its internal anti-discrimination policy;2 5 and second, that Member States are only
subject to the ECJ's interpretation of human rights requirements
when they are acting within the scope of EC law, particularly
when they are implementing EU laws. 6 The EU therefore has
no general human rights role, and the Member States are not
subject to EU or ECJ jurisdiction in relation to human rights
matters except within a relatively circumscribed context.

acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
Id.
22. See Opinion 2/94, supra note 20.
23. See Draft Treaty, supra note 4, O.J. C 169/1 (2003).
24. However, the general residual powers clause in Article 308 of the Consolidated
EC Treaty can be, and has been, used to enact a number of human rights measures
which fall within the EU's proper remit. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 21, art.
308, O.J. 325/33, at 153 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 140 (ex Article 235). See also Council
Regulation No. 1035/97, O.J. L 151 (1997) (establishing a European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia); Council Regulation No. 976/99, O.J. L 120/8 (1999)
(establishing a program on democratization and human rights in external cooperation
policy).
25. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 13, O.J. C 325/33, at 43 (2002),
37 I.L.M. at 82 (ex Article 6a). Id. art. 177, O.J. C 325/33, at 109-10 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at
117 (ex Article 130u). Id. art. 181, O.J. C 325/33, at 110 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 118 (ex
Article 130y). The use of human rights clauses in external trade agreements concluded
by the EC under Article 133 of the Consolidated EC Treaty is said to be based on international law. Id. art. 133, O.J. C 325/33, at 90-91, 37 I.L.M. at 108 (ex Article 113).
26. For the European Court of Justice's case law on this point, see Wachauf v.
Germany, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 328; ERT v. DEP, Case C260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925, [1994] 4 C.M.L.R. 540; Karlsson, Case C-292/97, [2000]
E.C.R. 1-2737. For the ambiguous codification of this case law by the Charter, see
Charter, supra note 1, art. 51, O.J. C 364/1, at 21 together with the explanatory memorandum to the Charter. For further discussion, see generally de Bilrca, supra note 1.
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III. THE EU'S LEGITIMACY DEFICIT: REDISCOVERING
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE THROUGH THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS
Momentum for broadening the EU's discourse on human
rights came, however, after the pivotal moment of the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union ("TEU") in 1992.27 The TEU moved
definitively beyond the previous largely functionalist approach
to integration and took the radical step towards economic and
monetary union, as well as some steps in the direction of political union. At the same time, the TEU accompanied and precipitated the first real signs of a popular legitimacy crisis. 2' The significance of the TEU as a turning point and the growing articulation of popular opposition to the EU over the past decade is a
story that has been told many times. Its particular relevance for
present purposes, however, is that at a certain point in the 1990s,
the Member States and the European Commission began to
have recourse to the language and discourse of human rights as
one of several strategies for responding to criticisms of the EU,
to its perceived legitimacy deficit, and to the lack of popular support or citizen identification with its policies. 29 At least three ad
hoc Comitds des Sages, or so-called groups of wise persons, were
appointed at different times and asked to present reports on various aspects of human rights in the EU including: the 1996
Comitg des Sages report on civic and social rights, 30 the 1998
27. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.j. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]). The TEU was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty
on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain
related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
These amendments were incorporated into the TEU, and the articles of the TEU were
renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 325/
5 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consolidated TEU], incorporatingchanges made by
Treaty of Nice, supra note 21.
28. SeeJoseph H. H. Weiler, Fin de Siecle Europe, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN
EVER CLOSER UNION? 203 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994);Juliet Lodge, Transparency and
Democratic Legitimacy, 32J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 343 (1994).

29. See Grdinne de Bfirca, The Language of Rights and European Integration, in NEW
LEGAL DvNAMCS OF EUROPEAN UNION (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995).

30. See Final Report by the Comite des Sages, For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights,
Chaired by Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo (1996); Report of the High Level Panel on the
Free Movement of Persons, Chaired by Simone Veil (1997).
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Comiti des Sages report on a human rights agenda for the EU, 1
and the 1999 expert committee report on fundamental rights in
2
the EU chaired by Spiros Simitis.1

While the 1998 report, in particular, emphasized the incoherence and the double standards practiced by the EU as between its external and internal policies, 3 and stressed the need
for a comprehensive human rights policy with adequate monitoring mechanisms, it saw no particular value in having a specific
EU bill of rights.34 The Simitis report, 35 on the other hand, recommended the adoption of a bill of rights for the EU. The EU
presidency seized the recommendation of the Simits Report in
1999 as a method to bring the EU closer to its citizens. Under
the German presidency of the Union, the European Council
called, at its Cologne summit in 1999, for the establishment of a
body ("Charter Convention")3 6 which was then charged with the
task of drawing up a charter of rights for the EU,3 7 with the apparent intention of showcasing what the EU was already committed to without needing to introduce any real change or any new
institutions or mechanisms.
This indeed was largely what occurred when the finalized
Charter, backed by political support from the heads of State and
31. Comiti des Sages, Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the European Union for the Year 2000, Agenda of the Comit6 des Sages and Final Project Report
(1998), available at http://www.eumap.org/library/datab/Documents/1048604636.54/
da_1998.rtf [hereinafter Leading by Example Report]. The Leading by Example Report was commissioned by the external relations Directorate General of the Commission at the time, and it resulted in a human rights agenda signed by Antonio Cassese,
Catherine Lalumiere, Peter Leuprecht, and Mary Robinson together with a report and
an accompanying volume of essays. See generally THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
6 (containing the volume of essays about the human rights agenda).
32. Affirming FundamentalRights in the European Union: Time to Act, Report of the
Expert Group on Fundamental Rights (1999) [hereinafter Affirming Fundamental
Rights].
33. See European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2000, available at http:/
/www.euromedrights.net/english/barcelona-process/EU_initiatives/Council/Councilannualreport.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003) (acknowledging these criticisms).
34. SeeJoseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charterof
Rights?, 6 EUR. L.J. 95 (2000).
35. See Affirming Fundamental Rights, supra note 32.
36. See The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, at http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/press/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003) (describing the "Charter Convention").
37. See Cologne European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, available at http://
ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDo.asp?BID=76&DID=57886&from=&LANG=l
(June 3-4,
1999).
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government, was proclaimed by the Council, Commission, and
Parliament at the Nice European Council Summit in 2000.8
What can be seen both in the provisions of the Charter itself, but
even more starkly in the proceedings of the European Convention which followed in 2002-2003,"9 is a high degree of political
anxiety about the potential impact of the Charter on the everelusive sovereignty of the Member States, and a determination to
neutralize any novel effects it might have. Apart from the prolonged prevarication about the eventual legal status of the Charter, the most notable manifestation of this anxiety is in the general and so-called "horizontal" clauses originally drafted by the
Charter Convention in Articles 11-51 to II-54. 4° Article 11-51 in
particular asserts that the Charter confers no new powers on the
EU, and that it does not alter the division of powers between the
EU and the Member States. 4 ' This is a clear example of the fear
of creeping competences,4 2 which lay behind much of the political determination to clarify the competences of the EU during
the constitutional European Convention.4 3 Yet, if this were not
safeguard enough, the working group of the European Convention, which was examining the possible incorporation of the
38. For more information on the Nice European Council, see Nice European
Council: December 7-9 2000, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice-council/index-en.
htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
39. See European Convention, supra note 3.
40. See Erich Vranes, The FinalClauses of the Charterof Fundamental Rights - Stumbling Blocks for the First and Second Convention, 7 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 7
(2003), at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-007a.htm. See also Draft Treaty, supra
note 4, arts. 11-51 - 11-54, O.J. C 169/1, at 28-29 (2003).
41. Draft Treaty, supra note 4, art. 11-51, O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003). Article 11-51 as
originally drafted by the Charter Convention provides:
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof
in accordance with their respective powers.
2. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community
or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.
Id.
42. See generally Mark A. Pollack, The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-Making
Since Maastricht, 38J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 519 (2000).
43. The issue of clarifying EU competence was one of the fundamental four issues
on the so-called post-Nice agenda which was identified by the European Council at the
Nice European Council summit in December 2000 as the basis for future constitutional
reflection and reform. For the eventual outcome of the Convention, see in particular
the Final Report of Working Group V on Complementary Competences, CONV 375/02
(2002); Draft Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 9-17, O.J. C 169/1, at 10-11 (2003).
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Charter into a future constitutional treaty, proposed further
reassurances of this kind within the horizontal clauses.4 4
This determination to limit the potential effects of the Charter can be seen in two specific amendments proposed by the
Charter Convention's Working Group, which were adopted by
the plenary of the Charter Convention into the text of the Draft
Treaty produced in July 2003." 5 The first such amendment was
to Article 11-51 (1) and 11-51(2) of the Charter, which declare
that the obligation of Member States and of the EU to respect,
observe, and promote the rights and principles in the Charter
must be carried out "respecting the limits of the powers of the
Union as conferred on it in the other parts of the Constitution,"
and adds that the Charter "does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union."4 6 This
clumsy over-egging of the pudding seems to have been a response by the working group to earlier observations which had
pointed to a tension between the obligation in Article 11-51(1)
on the institutions of the EU to promote the application of Charter rights and the assertion in Article 11-51(2) that the Charter
does not modify powers or tasks defined by the Draft Treaty.4 7
Apart from their apparent superfluity, the new amendments
seem unlikely to remove the tension in question. It appears inevitable and, to many, desirable, that the existence and incorporation of a Charter should influence the nature and interpretation of EU tasks and powers, although in subtler ways than the
crude notion of establishing new power suggests.4a
The second limiting amendment introduced by the Charter
Convention Working Group was to add a paragraph to Article II52 of the Charter, drawing a distinction between "principles"
44. See 2002 Working Group II Final Report, supra note 4.
45. See generally Draft Treaty, supra note 5, OJ. C 169/1 (2003).
46. See id., supra note 4, arts. II-51(1), 11-51(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 20 (2003).
47. See The European Convention, Summary of the Meeting held on July 23, 2002
chaired by Commissioner Antonio Vitorino, CONV 223/02,
11, available at http://
register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvOO/00223en2.pdf (July 31, 2002) (containing
interventions of the Directors of the Legal Services of the European Parliament, Council and Commission respectively, in a meeting of Working Group II on Incorporation of
the Charter).
48. See Grainne de Btirca, Human Rights: The Charterand Beyond, in THE FUTURE OF
THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Working Paper No. 10/01, 2001), available
at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/013601.html.
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and other rights contained in the Charter. 49 Provisions containing principles are declared to be judicially cognizable only in the
interpretation of legislative and executive acts that choose to implement them. This is the one amendment proposed by the
Working Group which appears to be an attempt to revisit the
substance of the Charter as drafted in 2000,50 despite the Working Group's assertion that it was proceeding on the basis that the
content of the Charter as proclaimed at the Nice European
Council should not be reopened. The amendment was pressed
in particular by U.K. members of the Charter Convention, since
the U.K. government's representative on the previous Convention which drafted the Charter in 2000 had attempted to keep
most social and economic rights out of the text and to divide the
Charter into two parts, but had been defeated in this attempt at
an early stage of the Charter drafting process. 1 The main motivation for this position seems to be the wish not to renderjusticiable many of the so-called economic and social rights, which are
49. See Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11-52(5), O.J. C 169/1, at 29 (2003). The
new subparagraph (5) of Article 52 provides:
The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented
by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions and bodies of the Union,
and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the
exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in
the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.
Id.
50. For a contrary view, see Olivier de Schutter, Les droitsfondamentauxdans le projet
europren (forthcoming) (on file with author) (describing the amendment to Article
52(5) as being "perfectly in conformity with the compromise which permitted the conclusion of work on the elaboration of the Charter during the summer of 2000"
["parfaitement conforme au compromis qui avait permit de clore
les travaux portant sur
l'laborationde la Chartre au cours de lVt6 2000"]). It is difficult to accept his conclusion,
in particular since he indicates clearly how other influential members of the Convention (specifically the French governmental representative, Guy Braibant) considered
that social rights under the Charter would and should be at least partlyjusticiable, even
in the absence of implementing measures, if they were invoked as negative constraints
against an action which directly undermined the essence of those rights. Yet, although
the amendment to Article 52(5) clearly states that provisions of the Charter which contain principles shall be judicially cognizable only in the interpretation of, or in ruling on
the legality of, acts which implement them, de Schutter argues boldly that a more generous (and, in his view, a more faithful) interpretation of the amendment would enable
such principles to be justifiable albeit in a limited way even without implementation.
51. For some of the interventions made by Lord Goldsmith, the U.K. Government
representative on the Charter-drafting Convention, see CHARTRE 4122/00 of Feb. 7,
2000, and CHARTRE 4146/00 of Mar. 8, 2000, available at http://db.consilium.eu.int/
df/default.asp?lang=en. For an account of the Charter process from Goldsmith's perspective, see Goldsmith, supra note 1.
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considered to require a greater degree of positive action and social expenditure than other rights. The aim of the amendment
to Article 11-52 seems therefore to have been to reclassify such
provisions as principles, while maintaining the more traditional
and often negatively framed civil and political rights as justiciable individual rights, since they are considered primarily to require non-interference by public bodies. This apprehension in
the Charter Convention about the potential impact of social and
economic rights being contained in the Charter is all the more
interesting given the fact that these rights were already significantly downgraded in the original Charter-drafting process,5 2 as
is evident from the weak wording of many of them and from the
fact that many are expressed as being subject to national laws
and practices. Further, the prohibition on judicial cognizability
seems to go beyond preventing those provisions from conferring
directly enforceable rights on individuals, and appears intended
to prevent the courts -

most particularly the ECJ -

from taking

any judicial account of them, even as interpretative aids or soft
legal sources.
There is of course an extensive and longstanding academic
and policy debate on the relevance of the distinction between
economic and social rights, on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other. This debate focuses on whether the alleged need for a greater degree of positive action, legislative intervention, and expenditure in the case of economic and social
rights requires a different legal and constitutional approach to
their enforcement, and challenges their alleged indivisibility
under international law.53 Whatever stance is adopted on this
contested question, the likelihood of the amendment to Article
11-52 rendering non-justiciable all of the social rights contained
in the Charter seems slight. The distinction introduced between
"principles" and "subjective rights" - to use the language of the
Working Group's explanatory note on the proposed amend-

52. See generally Lammy Betten, The EU Charterof FundamentalRights: A Trojan Horse
or a Mouse?, 17 INT'LJ. OF Comp. LAB. L. & INDUS. RELATIONS 151 (2001); Bob Hepple,
The EU Charterof FundamentalRights, 30 INDUS. L.J. 255, 266-70 (2001).
53. See, e.g., HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 237-323 (2d ed. 2000); CECILE FABt, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (2000); STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
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ment5 4 - is hazy, not least because there is no clear division
between economic and social rights on the one hand and civil
and political rights on the other in the Charter itself. While it is
undeniable that the latter division does not map onto a neat distinction between rights which require positive action or expenditure for their enforcement, and rights which require only noninterference for their protection, 5 it is also the case that the various social rights contained in the Charter are scattered across
different sections: the right to education is in Title II on Freedoms, the rights of the elderly in Title III on Equality, and the
right to social and housing assistance in Title IV on Solidarity.5 6
There are also provisions of the Charter expressed in terms of
principles, such as the principle of sex equality in Article 11-23
which has always been ajusticiable and indeed directly effective
right in EC law, which would almost certainly not suddenly be
rendered non-judicially cognizable by the amendment to Article
11-52 of the Charter.5 7 In further illustration of the lack of clarity
in relation to the distinction between rights and principles introduced by Article 11-52, the revised explanatory memorandum to
the Charter, which was supplemented to cater specifically for the
amendments made by the second Convention to the horizontal
clauses of the Charter,5 8 gives "the rights of the elderly''59 and
54. See Compromise Proposals Concerning Drafting Adjustments in the Horizontal
Articles (Working Doc. 23, 2002).
55. See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 53.

56. See Draft Treaty, supra note 4, art. 11-14, OJ. C 169/1, at 24 (2003) ("Right to
education"); id. art. 11-25, O.J. C 169/1, at 25 (2003) ("The rights of the elderly"); id.
art. 11-34, O.J. C 169/1, at 26 (2003) ("Social security and social assistance").
57. See id. art. 11-23, O.J. C 169/1, at 25 (2003) ("Equality between men and women"); id. art. 11-52, O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003) ("Scope and interpretation of rights and
principles"). Article 11-23 provides:
Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including
employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the
maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.
Id. art. 11-23, O.J. C 169/1, at 25 (2003). Article 11-52 provides:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be
made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others.
Id. art. 11-52, O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
58. See CHARTRE 4473/00 of October 11, 2000 (providing the original Charter
explanatory memorandum); Updated Explanations relating to the text of the Charter
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"the rights of the disabled "60 as examples of "principles" recognized by the Charter, even though these are clearly expressed in
terms of rights.
Yet, however awkward or difficult to operationalize they may
prove to be, both of these sets of amendments introduced by the
constitutional Convention Working Group to the Charter quite
clearly constituted attempts to limit its legal and judicial impact,6 1 to counter some of the anticipated effects of incorporating it within the draft constitutional treaty, and to return to the
idea of the legitimacy-enhancing showcase which the Charter
was initially intended by the European Council to be. The desire
of the EU institutions and of the heads of State and government
to enhance the legitimacy of the EU by drawing on the discourse
of human rights was accompanied by a no less pressing determination to do nothing to enhance the actual role or capacity of
the EU in the domain of human rights protection. In this way
the intense political activity that focused around the drafting of
the Charter, and the high-profile status that it subsequently occupied within the debates in the European Convention meant
that despite the eventual decision to incorporate it into a new
constitutional text, it was simultaneously reined firmly in and
hedged around with a series of constraints. The aim of these
restrictive provisions was to prevent the Charter from having
novel effects in practice, to confine it to showcase status, and to
reconfirm the orthodox position on human rights in the EU. In
other words, there should be no increase in EU powers in the
field of human rights protection, no extension in the scope of
of Fundamental Rights, CONV 828/03, July 9, 2003 (providing the memorandum as
revised after the second Convention had finished its work on the Charter).
59. Article 25 of the Charter declares that the EU recognizes and respects "the
rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in
social and cultural life." Charter, supra note 1, art. 25, OJ. C 364/1, at 14 (2000).
60. Article 26 of the Charter declares that the EU recognizes and respects "the
right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their
independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the
community." Charter, supra note 1, art. 26, OJ. C 364/1, at 14 (2000).
61. Although in fact, from the point of view of the judicial impact of human rights
in the EU, the complaint has most often been that the ECJ does not "take rights seriously" in the sense that it has only rarely struck down any provision of EU law, other
than individual administrative or staff actions, for violation of human rights. See Jason
Coppell & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 12 L.
STUD. 227 (1992); Joseph H. H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, 'Taking Rights Seriously'
Seriously: The European Court and its FundamentalRights Jurisprudence- Part 1, 32 COMMON MKT. L. Rv. 51, 579 (1995).
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application of EU law such as could affect the residual powers of
the Member States, and a restricted role for the ECJ in adjudicating the provisions of the Charter. The boldest decision taken in
the context of the Charter Convention's Draft Treaty, in a sense,
was the decision to commit the EU (with what would be a newly
acquired single legal personality) to accession to the ECHR.
The novelty of this move is that the EU institutions would henceforth be formally subject to the jurisdiction and scrutiny of the
European Court of Human Rights. 6 2 However, even in this context, the drafters felt the need to reiterate that accession would
not in any way affect the competences of the EU.63
IV. UNANTICIPATED EVENTS WITHIN THE EU: ARTICLE 7
OF THE TEU AND THE HAIDER AFFAIR
Even while the frustrations of the Charter and the Charter
Convention debates were absorbing so much of the attention of
political observers and legal scholars, other important developments have been taking place with considerably less fanfare and
analysis. The combination of the EU's preparations for its substantial enlargement eastwards and the repercussions of unexpected events within the EU have led to the introduction of legal
and constitutional changes with potentially very significant
repercussions for the human rights policy of the EU.
The first of these was the inclusion of Article 7 to the Treaty
on European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which
provided for the suspension of the rights of a Member State that
is in persistent breach of the fundamental principles, including
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, on which
the EU declares itself to be founded.6 4 Article 7 must be understood in the light of earlier changes that were introduced at the
time the TEU was drafted and signed. In 1992, Article 6 (ex
62. See Draft Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1-7(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 9 (2003). Article
7(2) provides: "The Union shall seek accession to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Constitution." Id. In recent years, in
fact, the European Court of Human Rights has been moving towards exercising a kind
of defactojurisdiction over actions of the EU. See Robert Harmsen, NationalResponsibility for European Community Acts Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Recasting
the Accession Debate, 7 EUR. PUB. L. 625 (2001).
63. See Draft Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1-7(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 9 (2003).
64. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 27, art. 7, O.J. C 325/5, at 12 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 69 (ex Article F.1).
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Article F) of the TEU was adopted, declaring that the Union was
committed to the respect of fundamental rights, and declaring
that the systems of government of the Member States were
founded on the principles of democracy.
It is difficult to avoid the impression that this was in part a
reaction by the Member States to the then recent fall of the
Communist regimes and to the likelihood of a wave of applications for membership from the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. This impression is bolstered by the fact that the Treaty
of Amsterdam five years later codified for the first time in the EU
Treaties the so-called Copenhagen criteria, by specifying in Articles 6 and 49 of the TEU that the EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and that respect for these
principles is a condition of EU membership.6 5 In other words,
the EU was asserting its own virtue and the virtue of its existing
members, while simultaneously sending a note of warning to the
new and future candidate States to the east. Further, the addition of Article 7 to the TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty, providing
for the possible suspension of the rights of a Member State
which was found to be in serious and persistent breach of the
principles in Article 6, was evidently perceived as a necessary
safeguard clause to provide for urgent action should one of the
newer democracies, after its admission as a member, collapse or
significantly fail to meet the standards asserted by the EU.
The pleasing irony, of course, is that the first time attention
65. See Bruno de Witte & Gabriel Toggenburg, Human Rights and Membership of the
Union, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: POLITICS, LAW AND POLICY (S.
Peers & A. Ward eds., forthcoming 2004); Manfred Nowak, Human Rights 'Conditionality'
in Relation to Entry to, and Full Participationin, the EU, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 31, at 687. See also Consolidated TEU, supra note 27, art. 6, O.J. C 325/5, at
11-12 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 69 (ex Article F); id. art. 49, 0.J. C 325/5, at 31 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 78 (ex Article 0). Article 49 provides:
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may
apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the
Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and
after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an
absolute majority of its component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
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focused seriously on this Article was when the Freedom Party
("FPO"), following its success in domestic elections, was about to
enter into coalition government in Austria in 2000.66 While the
other fourteen Member States collectively panicked, it became
apparent that Article 7 would afford no response since it required the existence of a "serious and persistent breach" of the
principles of Article 6(1 ).67 In Austria, however, there was no
evidence as yet of any breach of these principles, but rather a
generalized fear of the consequences of an extremely right-wing
party whose views on asylum-seekers and immigration appeared
to be highly illiberal, whose use of defamation laws against opponents was considered very repressive, and whose leader was perceived to be an apologist for the activities of the Waffen-SS during the World War II, coming into government in an EU Member State.6" The situation became an embarrassment for the
fourteen Member States when Austria refused to bow to pressure
and its conservative party went ahead to form a government with
the FPO, resulting in the imposition by the other Member States
of diplomatic sanctions on Austria without any clear sense of
how the problem could subsequently be resolved.6 9 The situation was eventually defused by the use of an ad hoc procedure,
where the president of the ECHR (which is not, of course, formally an EU court or institution) was requested by the EU presidency to nominate a three-person committee to report on the
situation in Austria and to make a recommendation to the fourteen Member States as to whether the sanctions should be revoked or not. This Report, which was published late in 2000 and
which did indeed recommend removal of the sanctions against
Austria, also contained a number of more general recommendations, many of which echoed the proposals of the 1999 Leading
66. See Merlingen et al., supra note 5 (describing the "FPO").
67. Consolidated TEU, supra note 27, art. 6(1), O.J. C 325/5, at 11 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 69 (ex Article F). Article 6(1) provides that "[t]he Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States." Id.
68. See K. Lesli Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Seruice Equals "Good Moral
Character?": United States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 157 (1997)
(describing the Waffenn-SS as "the elite armed guard and intelligence unit of the Nazi
Party of Germany").
69. See generally Mathew Happold, Fourteen Against One: The EU Member States' Response to FreedomParty Participationin the Austrian Government, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 953
(2000).
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by Example human rights report, such as the need for a human
rights monitoring body in the EU, and for more systematic mon70
itoring of the policies of the Member States in this respect.
The Austrian debacle led in fact to some longer-term
changes, including the subsequent revision of Article 7 of the
TEU by the Treaty of Nice in 2000. Proposals were put forth
during the Nice Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC")7 ' both
by Austria, as the Member State with perhaps most experience of
the deficiencies of the original Article 7, and by Belgium,7 2
which envisaged the possibility of taking action even in cases of a
threatened breach and not only where an existing serious and
persistent breach is found. The amendment to Article 7, which
was eventually agreed upon during the Nice IGC, finally came
into force in February 2003, so that now the risk of a serious
breach may trigger action in relation to a given Member State.7 3
Secondly, there is a provision for recommendations to be made
to the State in question, and the ad hoc Austrian solution has
been codified so that there is now a provision for the appointment of a committee of independent persons to report on the
situation in that State.7 ' The key lessons of the Haider affair, in
70. See, e.g., Alston & Weiler, supra note 6. See also MARTri AHTiSAARj ET AL., supra
note 7; Final Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the European
Union, supra note 7; European Parliament Resolution on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the European Union, supra note 7.
71. For more information on the Nice Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC"),
see 2000 Intergovernmental Conference, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc
2000/index en.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
72. See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, IGC 2000 - Article 7 of the TEU, CONFER 4782/00, available at http://
ue.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/4782en.pdf (Oct. 5, 2000).
73. Consolidated TEU, supra note 27, art. 7, O.J. C 325/5, at 12 (2002), 37 I.L.M.
at 69 (ex Article F.1).
74. See id. art. 7, C 325/5, at 12 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 69 (ex Article F.1). Article 7
provides:
1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of
four-fifths of its members after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member
State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and address appropriate recommendations to that State. Before making such a determination, the Council
shall hear the Member State in question and, acting in accordance with the
same procedure, may call on independent persons to submit within a reasonable time limit a report on the situation in the Member State in question. The
Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination
was made continue to apply.
2. The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Govern-
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other words were, in the first place, that it was not the advent of
a group of new States which might render necessary a system of
scrutiny of the internal democratic and human rights systems of
the Member States, and in the second place that a more systematic and procedurally appropriate process ought to be designed
if the Article 7 safeguard mechanism were to be a useful one
rather than a never-used emergency clause. The desirability of
introducing some system for monitoring the practices and policies of the existing Member States had therefore been highlighted more effectively and with more legal and political impact
than the various advisory reports over the years had managed to
do.
V. ENLARGEMENT AND THE SHARPENING OF THE DOUBLE
STANDARDS CRITIQUE
The allegation of hypocrisy and of double-standards as between the internal and external human rights policies of the EU,
which was articulated forcefully in the 1998 Leading by Example
ment and acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member
States or by the Commission and after obtaining the assent of the European
Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by
a Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), after inviting the government of the Member State in question to submit its observations.
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights
deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question,
including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that
Member State in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account
the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations
of natural and legal persons. The obligations of the Member State in question
under this Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding on that State.
4. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary
or revoke measures taken under paragraph 3 in response to changes in the
situation which led to their being imposed.
5. For the purposes of this Article, the Council shall act without taking into
account the vote of the representative of the government of the Member State
in question. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall
not prevent the adoption of decisions referred to in paragraph.
6. A qualified majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the weighted
votes of the members of the Council concerned as laid down in Article 205(2)
of the Treaty establishing the European Community. This paragraph shall also
apply in the event of voting rights being suspended pursuant to paragraph 3.
7. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the European Parliament shall act
by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of its Members.
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Report, has since that time increasingly been highlighted by
commentators and perhaps most starkly within the field of accession policy. 75 While the critique has been applied to the EU's
external policies in general, with particular focus on the consistent practice of inserting human rights clauses into trade and
cooperation agreements, 76 and in promoting human rights goals
in its development policies,7 7 the area in which the differential
standards between external and internal is perhaps most marked
is that of the EU's approach to enlargement. The latest round
of candidatures of Central and Eastern European countries has,
since 1997, seen a far more interventionist and ongoing process
of scrutiny of the human rights records of the applicant countries by the European Commission, than ever was the case
before. 78 Not only is there no apparent limit to the scope of
application of EC scrutiny, since all areas of national law and
policy - including those which clearly fall outside the scope of
application of EU competence in relation to its existing Member
States - are regularly examined, but the candidate countries
have also been held to standards to which several existing EU
Member States clearly do not conform, the most glaring of these
being in the field of minority rights, 79 a field which once again
was largely ignored when the Charter was drafted.8 ° This
double-standard problem has again recently been criticized in
reports by non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") active in
the field - in particular by the impressive EU Accession Monitoring Programme of the Open Society Institute ("EUMAP") 8 '
75. See Alston & Weiler, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6;

ANDREW WILLIAMS,

EU HuMAN RIGHTS POLICIES: A STUDY IN IRONY (ouP, forthcoming Apr. 2004) [hereinafter A STUDY IN IRONY]; Bruno de Witte, Enlargement and the EU Constitution, in THE EN-

209, 233-41 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003).
76. See generally ELENA FIERRO, THE EU's APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN PRACTICE (2003).
77. See A STUDY IN IRONY, supra note 75, at ch. 2.
78. See id.
79. See Bruno de Witte, Politics versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities, in
LARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

EUROPE UNBOUND:

ENLARGING

AND RESHAPING

THE

BOUNDARIES

OF THE EUROPEAN

(Jan Zielonka ed., 2002).
80. See Guido Schwellnus, Much Ado about Nothing? Minority Protection and the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Paper No. 5/2001, Constitutionalism Web Papers Series,
available at http://Iesl.man.ac.uk/conweb (last modified Aug. 7, 2003).
81. See Rachel Guglielmo, EUEnlargement: A Union of Values or a Union of Interests?,
available at http://www.eumap.org/articles/content/91/914 (Nov. 6, 2002); Stephen
Humphreys, Monitoring: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit, available at http://
www.eumap.org/articles/content/91/911 (Nov. 6, 2002).
UNION 137
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and by Minority Rights Group International ("MRG") .82
Further, the imminence of the 2004 enlargement, and the
disparity between the level of scrutiny of the human rights policies of the candidate States, as compared with existing Member
States, has raised the additional question whether the EU is suddenly to cease its pre-accession scrutiny and to lose all interest in
the policies of the Candidate States which were so vigorously
monitored during the accession process, once they become full
members of the polity. 3 Concern about the prospect of a sudden disappearance of interest in the human rights policies of the
new members upon accession has been voiced by some of the
relevant NGOs8 4 and also by politicians from the candidate
countries who, far from resenting the process and seeking its cessation upon membership, see an ongoing role for the EU in relation to all of its members on these issues.8 5
Here, two dimensions of the bifurcation of the EU's human
rights policy coming together are present.8 6 On the one hand is
the clear presumption raised by the differential treatment during the pre-accession process that such disparity is unjustified.
While on the other hand is the presumption - at least on the
part of certain actors from within the candidate States - that
the way to address the disparity is not to cease monitoring
whether before or after membership, but rather to extend the
scrutiny to all EU candidate States and Member States alike.
Combining these insights with the consequences of the
post-Haider revision of Article 7 of the Treaty on EU discussed
above, certain implications become apparent. The EU has an
82. See EU Accession Exposes Double Standards on Minority Rights, at
www.minorityrights.org/news detail.asp?ID=117 (Apr. 15, 2003); Alan Philips, Minority
Rights Group International, The Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities: A Policy Analysis, at http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/
pdf/FCNMPolicyPaperAug2002.pdf (2002).
83. See de Witte, supra note 75, at 240-41.
84. See Tim Waters, Judges for a New Order: The Case for Continued Monitoring after
Membership, Open Society Institute, at http://www.eumap.org/articles/content/91/912
(Nov. 6, 2002).
85. See Mihaela Gherghisan, Hungarian Party Proposes EU Minorities Committee, at
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=15&aid=9344 (Feb. 12, 2003). A proposal was made in the context of the Convention by Joszef Szjer of the Hungarian
FIDESZ party, who was a Hungarian representative in the European Convention, for
the creation of an advisory committee on minority problems in Europe. Id.
86. For an extended analysis of the nature and causes of this bifurcation, see generally A STUDY IN IRONY, supra note 75.
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interest in monitoring its Member States, both new (to ensure
fulfillment of the Copenhagen admission criteria) and old (to
enable appraisal of the risk of a breach of Article 7), but the
institutions and procedures established for doing so have so far
been inadequate. Reports and recommendations for change by
advisory groups, including Comitis des Sages or ad hoc experts appointed by the Council and Commission themselves, have not
led directly to institutional reform, and there remains an evidently strong political reluctance to envisage an enhanced role
for the European Union in relation to human rights issues concerning its own members. This role is still seen as one that is
primarily for the Member States themselves, in conjunction with
the supervisory role of the Council of Europe and the international human rights mechanisms.
Despite the growth in size, power and cohesiveness of the
EU as a political entity, despite the increasing transfer of powers
by the States to the EU, and despite its explicit adoption of a
constitutional discourse in recent years, a corresponding change
concerning the acceptance of the legitimacy of its interest in the
human rights policies of its members, and in shaping its own EU
human rights policy has evidently not come about.
VI. THE EMERGENCE OF MONITORING
In this partial vacuum, however, a number of interesting developments have been occurring on different fronts, which arguably contribute, despite the lack of political will or initiative,
to the likelihood of a more comprehensive and systematic EU
human rights monitoring system in the future. The first of these
is that a number of the NGOs themselves, most prominent
amongst them the Budapest-based Open Society Institute, whose
previous work has assisted significantly in the process of monitoring the systems of the candidate countries in terms of democracy, minority rights, sex equality, etc., 7 have begun to apply
their scrutiny also to existing EU Member States. In 2002, for
example, they reported critically on the situation of minorities
within the EU, including Muslims in France, Italy, and the U.K.,
87. See Open Society Institute, Reports on Monitoring the EU Accession Process,
available at http://www.eumap.org/reports (2001-2002).
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and the Roma in Germany and Spain. 8 s
The second promising innovation, this time initiated not by
third-sector actors such as NGOs, but by an EU institution, has
been the way in which the European Parliament has interpreted
the mandate of the revised Article 7 of the TEU and combined it
with the existence of the recently proclaimed Charter. The European Parliament declared recently in its annual report on fundamental rights in the EU that
it is the particular responsibility of the European Parliament
by virtue of the role conferred on it under the new Article
7(1) . . .to ensure (in cooperation with the national parliaments and the parliaments of the applicant countries) that
both the EU institutions and the Member States uphold the
rights set out in the various sections of the Charter."
In other words, the Charter is invoked here as a set of standards
which the European Parliament is to deploy, in conjunction with
national parliaments of candidate States and Member States, in
carrying out the mandate of Article 7 of the TEU to preempt the
risk of a serious breach of the principles of Article 6 by any State.
Further, in recognition of its own "lack of adequate resources,"
the European Parliament also called for the establishment of a
network of legal experts on human rights from each of the Member States to assist Parliament in providing "an assessment of the
implementation of each of the rights laid down in the Charter,
taking account of developments in national laws, the case law of
the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts and any notable case
law of the Member States' national and constitutional courts."90
The earlier calls which had been made by various ad hoc
committees9 ' for the EU to establish a human rights monitoring
agency either by extending the remit of the Vienna Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia and the associated RAXEN
network9 2 or by establishing an entirely new agency had at the
88. See Open Society Institute, Reports on Monitoring Minority Protection in EU
Member States, available at http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/content/09 (2002).
89. Final Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the European
Union, supra note 7.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., AHTISAARI ET AL., supra note 7; Final Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the European Union, supra note 7; European Parliament
Resolution on the situation as regards fundamental rights in the European Union,
supra note 7; Leading by Example Report, supra note 31.
92. See European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, at http://
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time been rejected.9 3 However, the call of the European Parliament this time to establish a network of experts, specifically for
the purpose of helping to operationalize Article 7 of the TEU
did not remain unheeded. A network of experts was established
by the European Commission late in 2002, charged with the task
of preparing an annual report on fundamental rights within the
EU, and the first such report was published in March 2003."4
Amongst the various interesting things in this report, including
its "indexing the Charter of Fundamental Rights to international
and European human rights law," thereby avoiding the tendency
to treat the Charter as a self-contained EU bill of rights which is
disconnected from the broader international human rights context, was the proposal to establish "an open method of co-ordination in implementing the fundamental rights set out in the Charter."9 5 The purpose of the proposal to establish an OMC was to
promote mutual evaluation and learning, with the aim of identifying best practice in relation to particular fundamental rights
which should be observed and promoted by all Member States.
This emphasizes the preventative and learning function of monitoring, rather than the ex-post dimension of scrutiny that would
be designed to discover and react to a violation. The report also
suggests that in some cases, the identification of a problem,
where it relates to or indicates a sufficiently serious disparity in
eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php (providing further information on the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia); RAXEN, at http://www.antiracisme.be/
raxen/raxen.htm (providing information on RAXEN). An external evaluation of the
work of the Vienna Monitoring Centre was made in 2002 and reported on by the Commission in 2003, where a number of criticisms were made, particularly in relation to the
comparability of the data provided. See Commission of the European Communities,
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia, COM (2003) 483. The Commission also reached the firm conclusion that
the Centre's remit should not be extended beyond race discrimination even to other
forms of discrimination covered by Article 13 of the EC Treaty, let alone to cover
human rights monitoring in general. Its proposal to recast the original Regulation establishing the Monitoring Centre is also included in this communication. Id. However,
at its meeting on December 13, 2003, the European Council (i.e., heads of government) finally decided that the mandate of the Vienna Center should be extended so
that it becomes a Human Rights Agency. See Conclusions of the Representatives of the
Member of the Representatives of the Member States, available at http://www.europaweb.de/europa/03euinf/l0counc/seatoffi.htm,
93. See Commission of the European Communities, The European Union's Role in
Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, COM (2001) 252,
part 5 (2001) (rejecting proposal to establish EU human rights agency).
94. See First Report on Human Rights in the EU, supra note 9.
95. Id. at 24.
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the standards of protection as between Member States, should
lead not only to a soft coordination of best practices by the
States, but to some kind of stronger harmonizing action or regulation by the EU. The network has since been used by a prominent U.K.-based NGO as the appropriate monitoring organ to
which to submit an unsolicited report setting out its concerns
about the impact of the so-called "war on terrorism" on individual rights and liberties, and democratic standards at both national and European levels. 6
More recently still, the rapporteur who drafted the European Parliament's 2002-2003 report on fundamental rights in
the European Union also drew on the methodology and aims of
the OMC process, by declaring that the European Parliament's
annual report itself "constitutes a valuable point of reference for
elaborating and implementing EU policies. It is also an open
method of coordination which highlights good practices in the
Member States and makes it possible to draw a comparison between initiatives and to ensure compatibility between them."9 7
Finally, in its recent communication on Article 7 of the TEU, the
European Commission argued strongly for a promotional and
preventative approach through ongoing monitoring, rather than
a crisis-reaction approach to be adopted to that provision.9 8 In
particular, the European Commission argued that the pilot project involving the network of experts on fundamental rights
which it had established in 2002 would be meaningful only if its
continuity or even permanence was ensured.9 9 And in another
sign of the complementary role being played by civil society organizations in the various human rights monitoring initiatives, a
European NGO has recently launched a petition °° to the European Parliament requesting it to initiate the Article 7 TEU procedure against Italy, for the serious and persistent breach of Arti96. Statewatch submission to the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, available at http://www.statewatch.org (Oct. 2003).
97. Final Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the European
Union and its Member States, supra note 7.
98. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Article 7
of the TEU: Respect for and Promotion of the Values on which the Union is Based,
COM (2003) 606 [hereinafter Communication on Article 7].
99. See id. 2.1.
100. Article 194 of the EC Treaty and Article 44 of the as yet non-legally binding
Charter, provide the possibility for any citizen or resident of the EU to address a petition to the European Parliament.
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cle 6 caused by its repeated violation of the freedom and pluralism of the media under Prime Minister Berlusconi.1 °1
What is the significance of the various invocations of the
mechanism of an OMC in the process of monitoring the practices of States in areas which affect human rights? The OMC is a
form of policy coordination, a version of which was first introduced in the EU when the States sought to coordinate their economic policies after the introduction of economic and monetary
union in 1992, and which was subsequently developed and applied to employment policy following the Amsterdam Treaty in
1997. Since then it has been expanded under the so-called Lisbon Agenda to a range of other policies and issue areas. 10 2 It is a
process of policy-making which is not uncontroversial, 10 3 but
which appears as part of a general attempt by the EU and its
Member States to find effective solutions to common and apparently intractable social and economic problems, while seeking to
avoid what are perceived to be some of the restrictive features of
traditional constitutional instruments and regulatory methods.
It has attracted attention because of its apparent promise in
addressing some of the central dilemmas of European integration. In the first place, it offers a methodology which can
neither be dismissed as primarily national or primarily EU-level,
but which is genuinely multilevel in nature, and which at its best
could integrate the European, national, and also regional and
local levels in the process of policy-making. And in the second
place, it has so far been utilized in many sensitive areas of social
policy such as employment, social inclusion (or anti-poverty),
pension reform, and education, raising hopes that it could constitute a means of promoting social and other forms of solidarity
in Europe in a context where the EU lacks the authority, legitimacy, and ability to pursue centralized policies.1 0 4 The OMC is a
101. For details of the petition and the allegations, see http://save-democracy.net.
102. See, e.g., Lisbon European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U.
BULL., no. 3 (2000) [hereinafter Lisbon Presidency Conclusions]; see also BUILDING SOCIAL EUROPE THROUGH THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION (Caroline de la Porte &
Philippe Pochet eds., 2002).

103. For critical analyses, see Damian Chalmers & Martin Lodge, The OMC and the
European Welfare State (LSE ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion
Paper No. 11, 2003); CAROLINE DE LA PORTE & PATRIZIA NANZ, OMC - A DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRATIC MODE OF GOVERNANCE? THE CASES OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENSIONS (forthcoming).
104. For some of the vast and growing literature on the open method of coordina-
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strategy that blends the setting of objectives at EU level with the
elaboration of Member State reports or plans in a reflexive, iterative process intended to bring about greater coordination and
mutual learning in the policy fields or issue areas in question.
There are arguably at least two reasons for the attractiveness
of an instrument like the OMC in the field of human rights.1 0 °
In the first place, the 0MC instantiates a process which clearly
seeks to move beyond the purely informational realm in which
annual reports on human rights - especially in the EU context
- have often languished. The aim is for the information gathered to be made useful, and to be employed not simply in an
attempt to shame participating States by its publication, but to
gather comparable data and actively encourage States to learn
from one another's practices, and to identify better ways of approaching shared problems, with the eventual possibility of resort to harder forms of regulation as a default or supplementary
solution in certain situations.
The second reason for the potential attractiveness of an
OMC-type mechanism in the EU human rights context is the
converse of the first, in the sense that it is likely to avoid the
powerful reaction by governments, which was seen in the discussion of the Charter above, against the extension of either the
EU's traditional regulatory powers in the human rights field or
of the ECJ's power to adjudicate upon and enforce certain types
of rights. In other words, it seems less interventionist, more voluntary, and thus less threatening to the sovereignty of the States.
What Member States seem to fear is something like the prospect
of an EU directive aiming to regulate, in a binding manner, the
conditions of prisons and psychiatric hospitals, or the ECJ proclaiming the right of access to health care or disability rights to
be directly enforceable in the national context. The 0MC on
the other hand is increasingly seen as an instrument that has the
capacity, if effectively designed and used, to navigate between
tion, both in general, and in specific policy fields, see EUC Books, Papers & Speeches,
European Union Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, available at http://
eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC (last modified June 16, 2003).
105. For a proposal to link the implementation of the rights contained in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights with the 0MC,see N. Bernard, A "New Governance" Approach to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the EU, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
UNDER THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 247 (Tamara Hervey & Jeff Kenner
eds., 2003).
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the stormy waters of the creeping competences debate, and the
stagnant waters of unheeded annual reporting. Whether the establishment of an OMC could successfully develop a serious information-gathering and standard-setting role, which influences
the practices of the States will depend, of course, on the extent
to which mechanisms to encourage national responsiveness and
interaction between States are built into the design of the
OMC,0 6 so that the process of monitoring does in fact move be-

yond the gathering, collation, and publication of information to
its use in reflexively shaping and implementing better standards
in practice.
VII. A SURPLUS OF MONITORING REGIMES?
One argument which may be mounted against this view is
that the growth of and the increasing emphasis on human rights
monitoring within the EU merely adds to the plethora of monitoring regimes existing at the regional and international levels,
without providing any added value. In particular, the UN, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"),
and the Council of Europe are all engaged in different forms of
human rights monitoring of the Member States of the European
Union amongst others. What could yet another layer of monitoring add to these existing systems?
Within the UN system, there is a range of different monitoring mechanisms. 0 7 In terms of the most comprehensive mechanisms, mention should be made in the first place of the system of
State reporting to the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").
Reports are generally requested of States within one year of ratification and thereafter every five years only. But there are regular problems of non-reporting and delays as illustrated by the
Committee's own recent lament that "only a small number of
States have submitted their reports on time. Most of them have
been submitted with delays ranging from a few months to several
years and some State parties are still in default, despite repeated
106. The "peer review" mechanism that operates within some of the other OMCs,
in particular that of employment policy, is currently under review in an attempt to
strengthen it and render it more effective. See The Peer Review Program of the European Employment Strategy, at http://www.peerreview-employment.org/en (2000).
107. See generally THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TrATV MONITORING (Philip
Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
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reminders by the Human Rights Committee.' ' 0 8 Moreover, as
observed by the Human Rights Committee in 2002, "[o]ther
States have announced that they would appear before the Committee but have not done so on the scheduled date.' ' 0 9 Individual complaints can also be made to the Human Rights Committee by means of a written and partly confidential procedure, but
this is a quasi-judicial function that is rather different from the
general and regular monitoring system."'
A similar kind of mandatory reporting exists: in the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the
Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, and as of 2004 the Committee on the Rights of Migrant
Workers."' In the event of failure by a State to submit a report,
most of these committees undertake their own monitoring of
the situation by relying on information supplied by other actors
such as NGOs, specialized agencies and other bodies of the UN,
and regional organizations. "Charter-based" monitoring is also
carried out by the UN Commission on Human Rights and the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, but these mechanisms are less systematic and are triggered either by complaints made by individuals or groups, or on
the basis of resolutions adopted at the Commission's annual session where problem situations in particular States are identi1 12
fied.
The OSCE system of human rights monitoring has evolved
over the years, and there are a number of different mechanisms
108. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 30 (2002) on Reporting Obligations of States parties under article 40 of the Covenant, in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 194, U.N. Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003). See generally, INEKE BOEREFIJN, THE REPORTING PROCEDURE UNDER
THE COVENANT

ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:

PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURES OF THE

HUMAN RiGHTS COMMITTEE (1999).

109. Human Rights Committee, supra note 108, at 194.
110. See LEADING CASES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (Raija Hanski & Martin
Scheinin eds., 2003).
111. See THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE TwENTY FIRST CENTURY
(Anne Bayefsky ed., 2001).
112. MIKO LEMPINEN, CHALLENGES FACING THE SYSTEM OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES OF
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS

MONITORING

MECHANISMS:

ESSAYS

(Gudmundu Alfredsson et al.eds., 2001).

IN

HONOUR

OF JAKOB
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including the Vienna mechanism which is based on specific State
requests to another State to provide information on a particular
situation, and the Moscow mechanism which builds on this to allow
for expert missions and powers of investigation to resolve a specific situation. There is also a provision for special and ad hoc
missions in certain circumstances, and the High Commissioner
on Minorities also can play a kind of monitoring role in States
where it is active in conflict prevention. But the OSCE - apart
perhaps from the Representative on freedom of the media does not have a system of regular information-gathering and preventive human rights monitoring and reporting, rather than one
that is based more specifically on conflict prevention and reac113
tion to crisis.
The Council of Europe also has a range of monitoring
mechanisms. The most wide-ranging and open-ended of them is
a system of monitoring introduced by the Committee of Ministers in 1994 when they adopted a Declaration on Compliance
with Commitments accepted by Member States of the Council of
Europe" 4 which has led to three types of monitoring: general,
thematic, l5 and ad hoc. The Declaration provides that "questions of implementation of commitments concerning the situation of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in any
[M] ember State" can be brought before the Committee of Ministers by one or more Member States, by the Secretary General, or
on the basis of a recommendation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Another of the Council's monitoring mechanisms, leaving
aside the judicial mechanism of the Convention on Human
113. See

QUIET DIPLOMACY IN ACTION:

THE OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NA_

(Walter Kemp ed., 2001); Steven Ratner, Does InternationalLaw Matter in PreventingEthnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 591 (2001).
114. See Relations with the Parliamentary Assembly, Parliamentary Assembly 1536
on Progress of the Assembly's monitoring procedure (2000-2001), at http://
cm.coe.int/stat/E/Decisions/2002/779/dO2_6.htm
(Dec. 2001). See also Andrew
Drzemczewski, The Prevention of Human Rights Violations: Monitoring Mechanisms of the
Council of Europe, in THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 139 (Linos-Alexander Sicilianos ed., 2001).
115. A wide range of general themes has been studied in relation to the situation
in Member States including: freedom of expression and information, functioning and
protection of democratic institutions, functioning of the judicial system, local democracy, policy and security forces, capital punishment, effectiveness of judicial remedies,
and non-discrimination, with emphasis on the fight against intolerance and racism.
TIONAL MINORITIES
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Rights, is that of the (revised) European Social Charter.16
Under the Social Charter, there is an annual system of State reporting to the Committee on Social Rights (previously the committee of independent experts), although not covering all provisions in the Charter in each year's report. Reports can also be
requested by the Committee of Ministers on provisions that
States have not accepted, but this is rare. Further, the Committee of Ministers can issue recommendations to States that do not
comply with commitments accepted under the Charter, following the regular reporting procedure before the Committee on
Social Rights. Following the adoption of an additional Protocol
in 1995, a collective complaints mechanism was created under
the European Social Charter to empower specified organizations
to lodge such complaints. ByJune 2003, sixteen such complaints
had been lodged. 17 Although the record of timely reporting to
the Committee on Social Rights is reasonably good, especially in
comparison with the UN system, the ESC system has been criticized for the length of the periods between consideration of particular provisions of the Charter, and for the distinction between
core and non-core provisions, as well as for the incompleteness
of information provided."' 8
In addition, the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
conducts regular and ad hoc visits to States and issues reports
thereon. 19 There is also a five-year reporting mechanism to the
Advisory Committee established under the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. While this system
seeks to engage States in an ongoing and consultative dialogue
with a view to improving practices, the Chair of the Advisory
Committee established to oversee its implementation has com116. There are also Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms under the Convention for the Prevention of Torture, which are more intensive than some others in that
they entail country visits and investigative procedures; and that which is carried out by
the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, which conducts country
studies every four to five years.
117. See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Bulletin, No. 59, at 39, at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Humanrights/PDFs/IB59Elight.pdf (Mar.-June 2003).
118. See generally DAVID J. HARRIS & JOHN DARCV, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER
(2d ed. 2001).
119. COMBATING TORTURE IN EUROPE (Rod Morgan & Malcolm D. Evans eds.,
2001); PROTECTING PRISONERS: THE STANDARDS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITrEE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE IN CONTEXT (Rod Morgan & Malcolm D. Evans eds., 1999).
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plained of the delays by States in the publication of its reports,
inadequate support from the Council of Europe's Committee of
Ministers, and an understaffed Secretariat.1 2 ' The Council of
Europe's European Commissioner on Human Rights also has a
broad mandate in the field of human rights, including awareness
raising, identifying shortcomings, and assisting in remedying
problems. However, there is no systemic monitoring or reporting mechanism, and the Commissioner has relatively few resources at his disposal.
To return then to the question posed above: is the EU, in
moving towards a system of ongoing monitoring of the human
rights practices of its Member States, simply adding another superfluous layer to the many existing and overlapping regimes?
The clearest answer to this argument is that while each of the
other systems described has its own particular strengths and
weaknesses, none of them enjoys the combination of regularity
and frequency of monitoring, the relative degree of institutional
and political closeness and trust between participating States,
and the established mechanisms, institutions and array of instruments for policy coordination and mutual learning as does the
European Union system. There is no mechanism, under any of
the international or regional monitoring regimes for the States
to cooperate following the provision of information; to engage
in systematic peer review or to foster exchanges with a view to
mutual learning; or to agreeing best practices, of the kind that is
built into the OMC process.
Further, in addition to the closer degree of integration between EU States and the leverage which this provides, there is
always - as was pointed out in the first report of the Network of
Experts - the possibility of recourse to a harder legal mechanism or to harmonization measures in a situation where a specific problem seems to merit such a solution. In this sense, the
EU, with its unmatched degree of institutional density and of
legal and political integration amongst participating States, is
uniquely well placed to develop an (internal) human rights system which is stronger and more effective than any of the overlapping regimes which exist on a regional or international level.
120. See Interview with Prof. Rainer Hofmann, at http://www.coe.int/T/E/
humanrights/minorities/5._5_anniversary/20031031_interv-hofmann.asp (last visited
Feb. 7, 2004).
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CONCLUSION
Returning to the three core characteristics of a human
rights system which were outlined above, the picture which
emerges of the EU's human rights system is one in which all
three elements are increasingly taking shape. As regards the judicial-normative dimension, the adoption of the Charter and the
likelihood of its being incorporated into a constitutional text in
the near future is one important step in this direction. The incrementally developed role of the ECJ in relation to the protection of individual rights could be considerably enhanced by this
development, despite the various constraints and limiting devices imposed on the Charter during the recent constitutional
convention. The third element, the crisis response element,
which came to prominence and was subsequently given a more
operative dimension through the revision of Article 7 of the
TEU following the Haider affair,' 2 1 has been refined somewhat
and indeed has begun to be invoked by civil society organizations in an attempt to bring sharper pressure to bear on Member
States which are perceived to be flouting the shared values of
democracy and human rights on which the EU is supposedly
based.' 2 2 But perhaps most interesting is the way in which the
second element, the monitoring mechanism, is emerging and
beginning to take shape, both as a consequence of the need to
operationalize the revised Article 7, and as a result of the imminence of full membership of the Candidate States which were
subject to such extensive monitoring processes in the pre-accession period.
One of the major critiques of the EU in the past has been
that its human rights policy was primarily externally focused. In
addition to the accession monitoring, the use of the human
rights clause in trade and association agreements, the mainstreaming of human rights in its development policies, and the
growth of the EU's human rights and democratization programme, all seemed to contrast starkly with the orthodox internal position, in accordance with which the EU was said to have
no general competence in the field of human rights protection,
and in accordance with which its legitimate interest in the practices of its Member States was apparently extremely restricted.
121. See Communication on Article 7, supra note 98.
122. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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And yet, the annual reports on fundamental rights within the
EU presented by the European Parliament in recent years, which
catalogue problems such as policing practices, anti-terrorism
measures, domestic slavery, protection of minorities, and freedom of expression, demonstrate clearly that the human rights
issues faced by Member States are often no less pressing than
those faced by many of the candidate states which were so thoroughly monitored, and indeed that there may be much to be
learned from the experiences and solutions tested by some of
the latter.1" 3 The apparently instinctive sovereignty-inspired impulse of Member State governments to reduce and confine the
role of the EU as regards human rights protection and promotion sits curiously and uncomfortably alongside the extensive
powers granted to the EU to intervene in so many other aspects
of economic and political life.
Yet there has been a vivid and interesting contrast between
the highly charged constitutional debate on the Charter with
heated discussions on how to confine the Charter strictly within
the existing competences of the EU, and how to render many of
its provisions non-justiciable on the one hand, and the low-key
but organic spread of more comprehensive monitoring of Candidate States and Member States alike, following the revision of
Article 7 and in the light of imminent enlargement. And if the
moves towards something like an OMC in the area of protection
and implementation of human rights are as yet embryonic, they
present a real way forward for an EU human rights policy which
avoids the circular disputes on the division of competences, and
the exaggerated dichotomy of justiciability and non-justiciability
which have characterized the constitutional-level debate on the
Charter. The three core elements of a functioning human rights
system are gradually taking shape, and while it may be some time
yet before the EU has a mature and full-fledged system, it is arguably one which for the reasons outlined above is uniquely
placed, amongst international and regional systems, to become a
strong and effective human rights regime.

123. See MattU Min~rik, The Quality of Democracy: Learning from the Candidates?, at www.eumap.org/articles/content/91/915 Nov. 6, 2002.

